This paper offers a sketch of an approach to punishment, according to a version of the contractarism, one could call “rational contractrism”, contrary to the normative contract of John Rawls. The rationalist treaty proposes a model whereby rational actors, who not only have minimal knowledge of their living conditions, would accept the contours of a social institution or a number of social institutions, because they see themselves best in such a society governed by such institutions, compared to a society governed by different institutional systems that are available for adoption. Applied to the institution of punishment, a rational contractual approach asserts that members of society would reach a broad consensus on the contours of a system of punishment based on the fact that they would see themselves as a failure of the deterrent effect of such a system. But they would reconcile the deterrent benefits of such a system with burglaries that turn any criminal system into personal freedom. Rational agents would introduce this penal system that maximizes the marginal advantage of deterrence without weighing too much on individual freedom. Any United Nations government can comply, diplomatically, with the United Kingdom Government, which informs other signatory and administrative governments of any respect. This agreement is also called The London Agreement. She set up the Nuremberg court. The paper also suggests that a rational belt approach is capable of grasping the best conclusions of the two main theories of alternative punishment: the theory of deterrence and retaliation. On the one hand, the rationalist contract shares the concept of deterrence that the main objective of any criminal system must be to deter crimes for which a crime is an act contrary to the substantive social contract. On the other hand, rational contractarism solves the central problem of pure deterrence theories – the problem that punishment from this point of view is to “use” individuals to achieve the general social objective of deterrence.